We relate the performance of mutual fund trades to their motivation. A fund manager who believes that a stock is significantly mispriced will want to trade in its shares.
but also diversified equity positions with, particularly for no-load funds, low direct costs for liquidity. This provision of liquidity, however, imposes significant indirect trading costs on open-end funds due to their structure. Fund managers must trade in response to unanticipated investor flows, forcing them to engage in trading in order to control liquidity that acts as a drag on performance. In providing evidence on the relative performance of liquidity-and valuation-based trades, we offer guidance on the importance of fund structures that are designed to limit the need for liquidity trading.
We also make a contribution to the literature that examines the abilities of fund managers to value stocks. If trade motivation matters, then a more accurate indicator of fund managers' stock-selection abilities should be based only on trades motivated by valuation beliefs and not by other reasons. Previous studies of fund managers' ability to value stocks evolved in an effort to increase the power of tests, shifting the focus of analysis from fund returns to fund security holdings and, most recently, to fund trades. 5 Our contribution to this literature is to present a more powerful test of fund managers' ability to value stocks that attempts to control for the motivation of trades.
Our efforts to separate trades based on their motivation makes use of both fund portfolio holdings and investor flows. We argue that a fund manager who believes that a stock is significantly mispriced will want to trade in its shares. However, heavy investor outflows (inflows) will constrain the manager by forcing him or her to control liquidity by selling (buying) stocks. Accordingly, we condition fund trades on the direction and magnitude of investor flows. If, for example, a fund experiences heavy net investor outflows but aggressively buys certain stocks, we argue that these buys are likely 5 See, e.g., Jensen (1968) , Lehman and Modest (1987) , Ippolito (1989) , Grinblatt and Titman (1989 , 1992 , 1993 , Malkiel (1995) , Gruber (1996) , Carhart (1997) , Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) , Wermers (1999) , Chen, Jagadeesh, and Wermers (2000) , Wermers (2000) , and Kothari and Warner (2001). valuation-motivated. If instead a fund experiences heavy net investor inflows and adds modestly across a large number of its existing stock holdings, a significant proportion of these buys are likely liquidity-motivated. The same logic applies to stocks that fund managers sell. Aggressive sales contemporaneous with heavy net investor inflows are more likely valuation-motivated, whereas modest sales contemporaneous with heavy net investor outflows are more likely liquidity-motivated.
In our efforts to isolate valuation-and liquidity-motivated trades, we also account for the possibility that some trades may be motivated by tax or window-dressing reasons.
Tax sales are likely to occur in October, the last month of the tax year for mutual funds.
Window-dressing trades most plausibly take place in the months coinciding with funds' semiannual fiscal periods when they are required to report holdings to investors. Thus, in addition to examining all trades regardless of month, we separately examine the subset of trades that remain after excluding sales in October and trades in mandated reporting months.
We apply our trade-categorization rules to the monthly portfolio holdings and investor flows of 324 actively managed U.S. equity funds from January 1997 to December 1999. For each fund in each month, we form separate portfolios of stocks bought and sold. For each fund, we then divide the buy portfolios into quintiles based on the direction and magnitude of net investor flows. This creates, on one extreme, portfolios of stock purchases made concurrently with heavy investor outflows and, at the other extreme, portfolios of stock purchases made concurrently with heavy investor inflows. We follow the same categorization algorithm to condition stock sales on investor flows. Within each buy and sell portfolio, we then split trades into quintiles based on their dollar value. We reason that large (i.e., high dollar value) buys that occur contemporaneously with heavy net investor outflows are dominated by valuationmotivated buys, whereas small buys that occur contemporaneously with heavy net investor inflows are dominated by liquidity-motivated buys. The same reasoning, with reversed flow direction, holds for stock sales.
The hypothesis that fund managers possess the ability to value stocks finds strong support. Valuation-motivated buys (i.e., large buys concurrent with heavy outflows) outperformed their benchmarks by an average 7.95% in the following year whereas valuation-motivated sales (i.e., large sales concurrent with heavy inflows)
underperformed by an average of 1.10%. The 9.05% differential between buys and sales is economically and statistically significant. Results are slightly stronger when October sales and mandated reporting-month trades are excluded in order to remove taxmotivated and window-dressing trades. These results indicate that when fund managers make purely valuation-motivated trades, they beat the market by a substantial margin that is notably greater than the margin for all trades, particularly on the buy side.
The hypothesis that motivation matters when assessing trade performance also finds strong support. In sharp contrast to valuation-motivated buys, liquidity-motivated buys (i.e., small buys concurrent with heavy inflows) underperformed their benchmarks by an average 1.65% in the following year. The negative return is consistent with fund managers being unable to beat the market when forced to invest excess cash from investor inflows. Further evidence that flow-induced liquidity-motivated trades act as a drag on fund performance is found in fund sales. Again in sharp contrast, liquiditymotivated sales (i.e., small sales concurrent with heavy outflows) outperformed their benchmarks by an average of 4.20%. This return is consistent with fund managers being forced to sell stocks they would have (correctly) preferred to hold longer based on their valuation beliefs.
We also use a second method for categorizing valuation-motivated trades that focuses only on buys that add currently unheld stocks to the portfolio and sales that fully terminate existing positions. We reason that a fund manager who has excess cash to invest from investor inflows will add incrementally across a large number of the stocks already held in the portfolio. Hence an initiating buy is likely based on a positive valuation belief of the stock being added. Conversely, a fund manager who needs to raise cash to meet investor outflows will sell incrementally across the portfolio, suggesting that a terminating sale is likely motivated by a negative valuation belief of the stock being sold.
We find that initiating buys outperformed their benchmarks by an average of 4.19% in the year after the trade, whereas terminating sales underperformed by an average of 1.07%. The 5.26% differential is both economically and statistically significant, providing confirming evidence that fund managers possess the ability to value stocks.
We also compare initiating buys (terminating sales) to all other buys (sales) on the belief that other buys (sales) consist of a much higher proportion of liquidity-motivated trades and lower proportion of valuation-motivated trades. Our results show a significant difference in the benchmark-adjusted returns for the two types of trades, confirming our earlier results that motivation matters when assessing trade performance.
Our research is closely related to Edelen's (1999) study of the relation between investor flows and the returns that fund investors receive. Edelen finds a statistically significant negative relation between investor flows and fund returns that he attributes to the cost of liquidity-motivated trading. Our study supports Edelen's argument with direct evidence that liquidity-motivated trades underperform relative to their benchmarks.
Our research also adds to recent evidence that fund managers possess the ability to value stocks. Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) argue that increased power for tests of fund managers' ability to value stocks is attainable by studying trades as opposed to holdings because trades reflect current valuation beliefs whereas holdings represent past decisions. Supporting their argument, they find that stocks widely held by funds do not outperform other stocks, but that stocks fund managers buy have an abnormal return that is 2.00% greater than the abnormal return of those that they sell. We extend the insight of Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) by controlling for trade motivation. The increased power of our tests adds to the growing evidence that fund managers have the ability to value stocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. Section I describes the data and sample composition. Section II explains the methodology used to condition trades on investor flows; empirical results are also presented and interpreted. Section III describes the design of the initiating-buys and terminating-sales tests, and then presents and interprets the results. Concluding remarks are made in Section IV.
I. Sample

A. Construction and Characteristics
Portfolio holdings data from November 1989 to December 1999 for those funds classified as U.S. equity funds were purchased from Morningstar. For a given date and fund, the database provides the name and identifier of each security held, number of shares held, and corresponding portfolio weight. Although funds are mandated to publicly report holdings only semiannually, some funds voluntarily reported holdings to Morningstar as often as monthly. Monthly reporting became markedly more prevalent in the latter part of the period covered by the database, particularly over the last three years.
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Given the importance to our study of the shortest possible time period between fundholdings dates, we thus focus on the three-year period dating from January 1997 to December 1999. To be included in our sample, a fund must have an average of more than two distinct portfolios per quarter in the Morningstar database and more than four distinct reports over this whole 3-year period.
7 These filter rules produce a total of 350 actively managed equity funds.
We then merged the monthly holdings information with monthly investor flow data purchased from Financial Data Concepts (FDC). FDC compiles the investor flow data from N-SAR reports that individual funds are mandated to file monthly with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission. The N-SAR reports detail monthly new sales (excluding reinvested dividends), redemptions, and reinvested dividends. In merging the 6 From January 1997 to December 1999, the average (median) number of holdings reports that were preceded by a report in the previous month is 288 (326) . The corresponding average (median) prior to December 1996 is 31 (26). 7 For each fund, I calculate this average as the ratio of the total number of distinct reports over this period over the number of quarters between the last date and the first date the fund had a holdings report in the database during 1997-1999. For example, consider a fund that is in my sample for four full quarters, say from January 1997 until January 1998, during which time it has 12 distinct monthly portfolio reports in the database. Hence, the average number of reports per quarter for this fund would be 3.
350 funds extracted from the Morningstar database with the FDC database, we lose 26 funds because of missing information. The final sample consists of 324 distinct funds from January 1997 through December 1999.
In Table I we report summary characteristics of the 324 funds in our sample. For comparative purposes, we also report summary characteristics of the actively managed U.S. equity funds that appear in the CRSP mutual fund database from January 1997 to December 1999 that are not part of our sample. Panel A shows that the mean and median total assets, number of stocks held, management expenses, and portfolio turnover rates of our sample funds appear to be similar to those of other U.S. equity funds. Panel B, which
reports fund investment objectives, shows that our sample has a higher proportion of aggressive growth, growth and income, and long-term growth funds than the population of U.S. equity funds, but a lower proportion of balanced, global equity, and total return funds.
****INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE****
B. Selection Bias?
Our sample consists of funds that voluntarily choose to report monthly holdings to
Morningstar. When asked about the incentives for funds to provide these monthly reports, a Morningstar employee emphasized that funds benefit from more frequent reporting of their holdings because it helps Morningstar perform a more accurate evaluation and rating of funds. Another possible incentive, suggested by Frank, Poterba, Shackelford, and Shoven (2003) , is a clientele effect whereby some investors who value more frequent disclosure are willing to pay higher fees. Whatever the reason for more frequent disclosure, we consider the possibility that sample selection bias might influence our empirical tests.
To examine whether our sample is overrepresented by well-performing funds, we compute monthly average alphas for the sample and non-sample funds using the onefactor capital asset pricing model. Return data from January 1997 through December 1999 were obtained from the CRSP mutual fund database. The alphas for the sample and non-sample funds differ insignificantly from zero and from each other. Thus, the sample does not appear to be overrepresented by well-performing funds.
To examine whether individual funds in our sample exhibit a tendency to only report holdings to Morningstar following good months, we compare alphas in reporting months to the alphas in non-reporting months. Again we find no evidence of selection bias, as the alphas for the reporting and non-reporting months differ insignificantly from zero and from each other.
Even if sample selection bias is present in our sample, our tests are valid for comparing the performance of valuation-and liquidity-motivated trades. Suppose that funds only report their holdings after good months. If these good months were the result of luck and not the ability to value stocks, then there is no reason to believe that performance of valuation-motivated trades should differ from liquidity-motivated trades.
II. Conditioning on Net Investor Flows and Trade Dollar Volume
A. Methodology
Our premise is that a fund manager who believes that a stock is significantly mispriced will want to trade in its shares. However, heavy investor outflows (inflows) will constrain the manager by forcing him or her to control liquidity by selling (buying)
stocks. In an attempt to separate fund managers' various motivations for trading, we thus condition fund trades (i.e., monthly ownership changes) on the direction and magnitude of concurrent net investor flows.
The ranking procedure we employ breaks possible serial and cross-sectional trading patterns that may be present in the data. A possible source of serial correlation in trading is the existence of stealth trading by institutions where multiple orders are used in an attempt to disguise their identity, as shown by, for example, Chakravarty (2001) . A possible source of cross-sectional trading is managers of different funds in the same fund family drawing on the same in-house research when making trading decisions as shown, for example, in Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2004) . Our ranking procedure breaks these potential serial and cross-sectional trading patterns. For each fund i, we measure the change in the number of shares held in each stock j from the end of month t -1 to the end of month t for each month in the sample period. 8 To ensure that our results are not influenced by fund managers' potential preferential access to IPO shares, as shown by Gasper, Massa, and Matos (2004) , we include only stocks that have traded for at least six months. Stocks bought or sold by fund i in portfolio-formation month t are then grouped into separate equally-weighted buy and sell portfolios. For each fund i, we rank and sort the monthly buy and sell portfolios into quintiles based on the BF and SF metrics, defined respectively as: The BF metric assigns buy portfolios with high total stock purchases and high outflows to the top quintile, BF1, and buy portfolios with low total stock purchases and high inflows to the bottom quintile, BF5. The SF metric assigns sell portfolios in an analogous manner. Because we use the time-series observations for each fund separately to rank on BF and SF, by construction serial or cross-sectional patterns in the data are broken.
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To illustrate the rationale behind the BF and SF metrics, consider a two-month scenario for a fund, t 1 and t 2 , where the fund has total net assets of $100 million in each 9 The results we report in this paper use time-series BF and SF rankings. Results are not substantively different when we use cross-sectional BF and SF rankings. 10 To illustrate how this ranking procedure breaks time-series patterns due to overlapping holding periods, consider the following example. Suppose that Fund A has a time series of 36 buy portfolios that were created every month of the sample period and held for 12 months. Our ranking on BF will place seven of the buy portfolios in BF1, another seven in BF2, and so on, in no particular time-series order. The portfolios in any of the quintiles are therefore not necessarily drawn from consecutive months. To illustrate how this procedure breaks cross-sectional patterns, consider Fund A and Fund B, both of which have a time series of 36 buy portfolios. Our ranking on BF is done separately for each fund, placing seven of the buy portfolios in BF1, another seven in BF2, and so on for Fund A. The same process is repeated independently for Fund B. All of Fund A's BF1 portfolios will be aggregated with the independently created BF1 portfolios of Fund B even if they buy some of the same stocks each month due to the difference in the monthly flows. Because ranking was done for each fund separately, the BF1 portfolios of Funds A and B will most likely correspond to portfolios formed at different points in time.
month. During month t 1 , the fund experiences outflows of $5 million and purchases $2 million worth of stocks. Presuming that the fund manager will only buy those stocks that are perceived to be notably underpriced despite a need to raise cash to meet investor outflows, we can infer that a large proportion of the fund's purchases were valuationmotivated trades. Now consider month t 2 , when the fund experiences inflows of $5 million and purchases $3 million worth of stocks. Presuming that heavy net investor inflows will compel the fund manager to invest excess cash, we can infer that a smaller proportion of the fund's purchases during t 2 relative to t 1 were likely to have been valuation motivated. The BF metric captures this intuition by assigning higher scores to buy portfolios that are more likely comprised of larger proportions of valuationmotivated trades. Consistent with this intent, the BF metric assigns scores of [2 -(-5)]/100 = 0.07 and (3 -5)/100 = -0.02 to months t 1 and t 2 , respectively. Symmetrical intuition applies to the SF metric when used to rank the sell portfolios.
In an attempt to further refine trade categorization, we place each trade within each flow-categorized portfolio into a quintile based on its dollar value.
11 Our rationale is that fund managers who strongly believe that a stock is significantly underpriced (overpriced) will buy (sell) a relatively large amount of that particular stock over the month, but fund managers who need to control liquidity will spread relatively smallersize purchases (sales) across a number of stocks. Thus, large trades (in trade-size quintile TS1) are more likely valuation motivated, whereas the small trades (in trade-size quintile TS5) are more likely liquidity motivated.
We argue that large buys (in TS1) that occur contemporaneously with heavy net investor outflows (in BF1) are characterized by the highest proportion of valuationmotivated buys, whereas small buys (in TS5) that occur contemporaneously with heavy net investor inflows (in BF5) are characterized by the highest proportion of liquiditymotivated buys. The same reasoning, with reversed flow direction, holds for fund sales.
We evaluate the buy-and-hold returns for each of the equally-weighted buy and sell portfolios for three different holding periods. 12 The holding periods are denoted by t+12, t+6, and t+3, where t+12 stands for the holding period from the end of the portfolio formation month t until the end of month t+12 and so on. We use the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) performance-measurement methodology that benchmarks the return of each stock against a portfolio of stocks that have similar size, book-to-market, and momentum characteristics. All benchmark-adjusted returns are measured for a period corresponding to the length of the holding period. Thus, annual, semi-annual, and quarterly returns are reported for holding periods t+12, t+6, and t+3, respectively. Once the benchmark-adjusted returns are determined for each portfolio for each fund, these returns are averaged across all portfolios that share a common characteristic such as BF, SF, or TS.
B. Buy Results
In Table II then portfolio BF1/TS1 should exhibit a positive benchmark-adjusted return. Consistent with having such ability, BF1/TS1 shows a statistically significant 7.95% benchmarkadjusted return in the year following the portfolio formation month.
As we move down the rows and across the columns from BF1/TS1, the portfolios should be characterized by a decreasing proportion of valuation-motivated buys and an increasing proportion of liquidity-motivated buys. Thus, if motivation matters when assessing trade performance, as we move down the rows and across the columns, we should observe decreasing returns. This pattern holds in general, suggesting that trade motivation is related to performance. The overall difference between the high outflow and high inflow quintiles (BF1-BF5) is a statistically significant 4.57%, as is the 3.45%
overall difference between the large and small trade quintiles (TS1-TS5).
As mentioned earlier, the most powerful test of whether trade motivation matters is achieved by comparing the two extremes: BF1/TS1 (i.e., large buys concurrent with heavy outflows), which should have the highest proportion of valuation-motivated buys, and BF5/TS5 (i.e., small buys concurrent with heavy inflows), which should have the highest proportion of liquidity-motivated buys. BF1/TS1 outperforms BF5/TS5 by a statistically significant 9.61% in the year following the portfolio formation month, providing strong support for the hypothesis that trade motivation matters.
Panels B and C tell the same qualitative story for six-and three-month holding periods, respectively. The return magnitudes are smaller than for the one-year period, indicating the return patterns continue beyond three and even six months, and we observe the same general pattern of decreasing returns as we move down the rows and across the columns from BF1/TS1. Again consistent with trade motivation mattering, BF1/TS1 outperforms BF5/TS5 by a statistically significant 5.01% and 1.79% in the six-and threemonth periods following the portfolio formation month, respectively.
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C. Sell Results
In Table III 14 These results suggest that the patterns observed for holding period t+12 occur over the entire year, not in just the first six or three months.
Overall, the hypotheses that mutual fund managers have the ability to value stocks and that motivation matters when assessing trade performance find weaker support in the sales results than in the buy results. One possible explanation is that mutual fund managers typically face short-selling restrictions that prevent them from taking action when a particular stock is believed to be overpriced, unless it is currently owned. Thus, short-selling restrictions create an asymmetry in that fund managers can only take unfettered action when any stock (within their allowable realm) is believed to be underpriced. A second possible explanation for the weaker sales results is that fund managers' selling decisions are distorted by behavioral effects such as the disposition effect, which is the behavioral tendency of investors to sell past winners too soon and ride past losers too long. 15 A third possible explanation for the weaker sales results is that a substantial proportion of sales may have been motivated by tax or window dressing considerations, which would add noise to our method of separating valuation-motivated from liquidity-motivated trades. We turn next to tests designed to control for potential tax-loss selling and window dressing.
D. Tax Loss Selling and Window Dressing
In an attempt to further isolate valuation-and liquidity-motivated trades, we account for the possibility that some trades may be motivated by tax or window-dressing reasons. Tax sales are likely to occur in October, the last month of the tax year for mutual funds. Window-dressing trades most likely take place in the months coinciding respectively, consistent with Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) . Oddly, the return is a significantly positive .88% over a one-year holding period. 15 Evidence for the presence of the disposition effect in the decisions of individual investors has been documented by Odean (1998). Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) also document that the disposition effect has a significant impact on the decisions of institutional investors.
with funds' semiannual fiscal periods when they are required to report holdings to investors. To exclude potential tax-loss selling and window-dressing trades, we thus repeat our tests excluding sales in October and sales and buys in mandated reporting months.
16 Table IV 
III. Initiating Buys and Terminating Sales
A. Methodology
As an alternative test of a fund manager's ability to value stocks, we examine the performance of buys that initiate a position and sells that fully liquidate a position from the portfolio. Suppose that a fund manager does not believe that any stocks are currently underpriced by an amount sufficient to justify their purchase. We reason that if this fund manager is saddled with excess cash from investor inflows, he or she will add incrementally across a large number of the stocks already held in the portfolio. Hence initiating buys, defined as the purchase of a currently unheld stock, are likely to be based on a strongly positive valuation belief of the stock being added. Conversely, absent the belief that any currently held stock is overpriced, a fund manager who needs to raise cash to meet investor outflows will sell incrementally across the portfolio. This suggests that terminating sales, defined as the sale of the entire position in a currently held stock, are likely motivated by a negative valuation belief of the stock being sold. Thus, if fund managers possess the ability to value stocks, then we should observe positive benchmarkadjusted returns for initiating buys and negative returns for terminating sales.
As before, for each fund i we measure the change in the number of shares held in each stock j from the end of month t -1 to the end of month t for each month in the sample period. Buys that initiate positions and sells that terminate positions for fund i in portfolio-formation month t are then grouped into separate equally-weighted initiating buy and terminating sell portfolios. To clarify, we form one initiating buy portfolio and one terminating sell portfolio (when possible) for each fund in each month. Each of these initiating buy and terminating sell portfolios are treated as separate observations. Again as before, we evaluate the buy-and-hold returns for each of these portfolios for different periods ranging from 12 to three months by using the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) performance-measurement methodology to determine benchmarkadjusted returns. The benchmark-adjusted returns for the individual portfolios are averaged separately for the initiating buys and terminating sells. As before, all benchmark-adjusted returns are measured for a period corresponding to the length of the holding period. Thus, annual, semi-annual, and quarterly returns are reported for holding periods t+12, t+6, and t+3, respectively. Once the benchmark-adjusted returns are determined for each portfolio for each fund, these returns are averaged across all initiating buy portfolios and all terminating sales portfolios. We also compare initiating buys (terminating sales) to all other buys (sales) on the belief that other buys (sales) consist of a higher proportion of liquidity-motivated trades and lower proportion of valuation-motivated trades. This is done by first constructing a second set of portfolios in an analogous manner to the set of initiating buys and terminating sales portfolios previously described. If trade motivation matters, there should be a significant difference between the returns of the initiating and non-initiating buy portfolios and of the terminating and non-terminating sales portfolios. For the oneyear holding period, initiating buys outperformed non-initiating buys by 2.45% and terminating sales underperformed non-terminating sales by 3.74%. The return differentials decrease with the length of the holding period, but are nevertheless statistically significant in every case. The evidence confirms our earlier results that motivation matters when assessing trade performance.
B. Results
Panel A of
C. Robustness Check
In this section, we account for the possibility that managers of different funds in the same fund family, perhaps by drawing on the same in-house research, made similar investment decisions in the same stock in the same month. Recall that when we ranked portfolios on the BF and SF metrics, we used the time-series observations for each fund separately, which broke serial or cross-sectional trading patterns that may have been present in the data. With our algorithm for creating the initiating-buy and terminating-sales portfolios, however, cross-sectional dependence of portfolio returns would be created by fund managers from the same fund family trading together, biasing our test statistics. To address this potential cross-sectional dependence, we aggregate all the common initiating buys and terminating sales of funds in the same family together. To clarify, if three funds in the same family initiate a position in a particular stock in the same month, then only one initiating buy is recorded for the whole fund family. there was a significant difference in the benchmark-adjusted returns of initiating buys and terminating sales of 3.56%. All of these results are strengthened when potential taxmotivated and window dressing trades are excluded. Furthermore, these results increase with the length of the holding period, again indicating that the performance occurs over the entire 12-month holding period. In sum, these results confirm the earlier findings that motivation matters when assessing trade performance.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Our results are consistent with the hypotheses that fund managers possess the ability to value stocks and that motivation matters when assessing trade performance.
Conditioning on the size of trades and net investor flows, we find that valuation-motivated buys outperformed their benchmarks by an average 7.95% in the following year. In contrast, liquidity-motivated buys underperformed by 1.65%, suggesting that fund managers were unable to beat the market when forced to invest excess cash from investor inflows. The evidence from fund sales tells a similar but more muted story.
Valuation-motivated sales underperformed their benchmarks by 1.10%. In contrast, liquidity-motivated sales outperformed by 4.20%, suggesting that fund managers were compelled to sell stocks they would have (correctly) preferred to hold longer based on valuation beliefs. These results were slightly stronger when the tax and reporting months were excluded.
Alternative tests that focus on initiating buys and terminating sales support these results. Specifically, initiating buys outperformed their benchmarks by an average of 4.19% in the following year whereas terminating sales underperformed by 1.07%, providing additional evidence that fund managers possess the ability to value stocks.
Furthermore, initiating buys outperformed non-initiating buys by 2.45% and terminating sales underperformed non-terminating sales by 3.74%, again confirming that motivation matters when assessing trade performance.
Our research has policy implications for recent SEC deliberations on requiring more frequent public reporting of the holdings of mutual fund portfolios. 17 Our evidence that fund managers have the ability to value stocks is supportive of Wermers (2001), who argues that professional investors would potentially use more frequent reporting to frontrun and free-ride on the information gathering and analysis efforts of the funds. 18 Such actions by outside investors would reduce fund managers' incentive to pay for these costly efforts, perhaps making the capital markets less efficient.
Our research also has implications for the structural design of mutual funds. Our evidence indicates that when fund managers trade for valuation reasons, particularly on the buy side, they perform well. However, as Chordia (1996) , Edelen (1999) , and Nanda, Narayanan, and Warther (2000) point out, the structure of open-end funds sometimes forces fund managers to trade for liquidity reasons. Our results show that such liquiditymotivated trading by fund managers not only results in transaction costs, but also significant trading losses. The benefits of liquidity to investors must be carefully weighed against its costs when considering front-end loads, back-end loads, redemption fees, delayed withdrawals, and other fund features that are designed to limit the need for liquidity-motivated trading.
Finally, our research relates to the recent allegations of late trading and market timing abuses by sophisticated institutional investors. Fund investors who buy and hold for the long term not only suffer "dilution" losses, but also trading losses when fund managers are forced to respond to flows that are induced by late trading and market timing with liquidity-motivated trades. While the SEC has proposed Rule 22c-2 aimed to stop these abuses by placing a 2% fee on short-term in-and-out trading, it has a secondary effect in that it will make it easier for funds to manage liquidity. 19 In turn, this should, arguably, lead to improved performance.
would be profitable to use the current semi-annual reports to identify initiating buys and hold them for nine months, on average, as the purchase date must have been sometime between the current and previous semiannual report. Wermers, Russ, 2001, The potential effects of more frequent portfolio disclosure on mutual fund performance, Investment Company Institute Perspective 7 (June).
Table I Fund Characteristics
This table reports summary characteristics of the 324 funds in our sample and the other actively managed U.S. equity funds that appear in the CRSP mutual fund database from January 1997 to December 1999 but are not part of our sample. Panel A reports the mean and median total assets, number of stocks held, management expenses, and portfolio turnover rate. Panel B reports fund investment objectives. All data is obtained form the CRSP mutual fund database. 
A. Fund Characteristics
Table II Performance of Stock Purchases
This table reports performance results for stock purchases categorized by net investor flows and trade size. Panels A, B, and C present benchmark-adjusted returns and associated t-statistics for holding periods t+12, t+6, and t+3, respectively. Annual, semi-annual, and quarterly returns are reported for holding periods t+12, t+6, and t+3, respectively. The first three rows and three columns of each panel report results from our two-way sort on investor flows and trade size. The fourth row and fourth column report results from a one-way sorting only on trade size and investor flows, respectively. The fifth row and fifth column report the difference between the extreme trade-size and investor-flow quintiles, respectively. Finally, the entry in the sixth row of the sixth column represents the difference in returns between the two most extreme portfolios based on investor flows and trade size. Returns are adjusted against the benchmarks of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) , and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
A. Holding Period = 12 Months
Table III Performance of Stock Sales
This table reports performance results for stock sales categorized by net investor flows and trade size. Panels A, B, and C present benchmark-adjusted returns and associated t-statistics for holding periods t+12, t+6, and t+3, respectively. Annual, semi-annual, and quarterly returns are reported for holding periods t+12, t+6, and t+3, respectively. The first three rows and three columns of each panel report results from our two-way sort on investor flows and trade size. The fourth row and fourth column report results from a one-way sorting only on trade size and investor flows, respectively. The fifth row and fifth column report the difference between the extreme trade-size and investor-flow quintiles, respectively. Finally, the entry in the sixth row of the sixth column represents the difference in returns between the two most extreme portfolios based on investor flows and trade size. Returns are adjusted against the benchmarks of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) , and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
A. Holding Period = 12 Months
